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Abstract
The banking systems stability problem is complex and comprehensive. It is believed that the
network topological features play a predominant role in banking system robustness. Existing
research has investigated diﬀerent sides of this relation; however, these studies do not take into
account the durability of interbank and external interactions. The current paper proposes to
place links to diﬀerent layers of the multiplex network according to their durability. For this
purpose an edge length concept reﬂecting the dynamical essence of the banking network is
introduced. The oﬀered approach is also applied to banks-with-customers interactions added
to interbank links.
Keywords: modelling, banking system, customers, banks-with-customers network, multiplex networks,
dynamic lengthed network, topological network features, stability
1 Introduction and motivation
Financial crises remain unpredictable phenomena and there is still no prescription for actions
even when crisis becomes obvious. On the one hand, this complexity is due to the intercon-
nectedness of ﬁnancial systems with other systems and with random natural phenomena. On
the other hand, the banking system as a subgroup of the ﬁnancial system also has a strong
inﬂuence on its instability. Therefore, banking systems’ crises are important to predict, not
only to avoid their ﬁnancial eﬀects, but also to avoid problems in other spheres of life.
Current literature analysis shows many studies ﬁnding solutions for the banking system
instability problem with respect to the network structure characteristics. Analysis of groups
of such features [10] show that it is the network topology that plays the predominant role in
systemic stability. Other works [14, 4, 3] analysed pre- and post-crisis studies on the network
features of real-world banking networks. Risk analysis also considers topological network prop-
erties for their results estimation [4, 5, 7]. At the same time, their analysis implies a static
network in the problem statement, while banking systems are dynamical and tend to evolve
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over time. A majority of authors evaluate network features for all edges in the network and do
not take into account repayment dates of each interaction.
The important particularity of banking systems is the necessity of input and output links to
be consistent inside each kind of repayment group. Network topological features evaluated for
all edges in the network can lose their value after deleting overnight edges, for example. Let us
consider the situation of a bank with long-term input links and overnight output links.1 If, for
today, the links seem to be balanced with each other, tomorrow we will lose overnight links so
that the bank state becomes risky, and we can do nothing about this situation. Therefore, taking
the durability of links into account is necessary to improve predicting ability of topological
network features.
The modelling of a bank’s policy limitation according to Basel [12] also leads us to the
necessity of a multiplex representation for interbank markets.
Thus, our idea is to distinguish network links for their terms of repayment to make them
consistent for durability. We accomplish this using multiplex networks for deploying banking
systems as directed weighted lengthed graphs. Each layer of the multiplex network is speciﬁed
with links in a diﬀerent durability range. For this purpose each link is assigned not only with a
“weight” attribute, but also with a “length” corresponding to the number of iterations before
a link disappears.
2 Background
Multiplex networks are multilayer networks in which each node in the layer has one counterparty
in the neighbouring layer. Such networks are often used for diﬀerent kinds of link-related actions.
The literature on the available multiplex network approaches is still recent, particularly in
the context of banking system modelling. The more comprehensive study on multilayer networks
is presented by Kivela et al. [9]. Some of the works on ﬁnancial networks are concentrated on
systemic risk measurement [13, 11]. They consider diﬀerent types of exposures and present a
single layer of multi-layered network for each of them.
Our multiplex representation is based on the dynamical context of the problem. As links
can appear and disappear we measure links’ lifespans with their lengths and build multiplex
layers using edges of diﬀerent lengths. Links length are changed on each iteration, so we obtain
an updated multiplex after each step.
Some deﬁnitions that we employ for our model are presented below.
Deﬁnition 1. Dynamic graph — graph G = {Gt}, where t ∈ T — iterations for model trans-
formation.
Deﬁnition 2. Lengthed graph — a dynamic graph, where edge el has its “length” attribute
l ∈ N: if el ∈ Gt0 ⇒ el−1 ∈ Gt0+1, . . . , e1 ∈ Gt0+l−1, e0 /∈ Gt0+l.
Deﬁnition 3. Operator ⊕. G1 ⊕G2 = G : ∀e ∈ G ⇒ e ∈ G1 or e ∈ G2
Deﬁnition 4. Multiplex graph M = (L0, L1, . . . , Ln), where Li — layers presented with graphs:
1) ∀k, p ∈ N ∀v1 ∈ Lk ∃ ! v2 ∈ Lp and ∀v1 ∈ Lp ∃ ! v2 ∈ Lk ;
2) L0 = ⊕i∈[1..n]Li.
1We assume a long-term interaction to last for more than a month, overnight for the following day, and a
short-term link endures for less than a month, but longer than overnight.
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Figure 1: Example of edges’ lengths changes for dynamic graph. t0 — some iteration number,
Gt0 — graph state for iteration t0, el — edge of length l
Taking into account the previous deﬁnitions and taking G = (V,E), where V is set of vertices
and E is set of edges, we present below the multiplex representation for our dynamic graph.
For each iteration t ∈ T , we can put multiplex network Mt corresponding to graph condition
Gt, such that: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∀e ∈ E : e = (v1, v2, w, l)
Mt = {Li(t)}, where i ∈ [0..n]
∀t Li(t) = {el ∈ Gt| l ∈ Li}
∀t L0(t) = L1(t)⊕ · · · ⊕ Ln(t)
∀t ∀e ∈ Gt ⇔ e ∈ L0(t)
(1)
where v1 — source vertex, v2 — target vertex, w — weight, l — length, G — weighted lengthed
directed dynamic graph, Li — a set of length values considered in the ith layer.
Because the banking system links should be balanced for each kind of durability, it is
appropriate to evaluate network features for single layers of the multiplex instead of doing this
for whole network edges. Thus, multiplex performance is a quite handy and simple way.
3 Model
3.1 Multiplex network in terms of banking system
The banking system model is represented with a multiplex directed weighted lengthed network.
We consider banks and customers as nodes of the graph, and interbank lending and bank-with-
customer interactions as edges. Thus, if e = (v1, v2, w, l) then w (“weight” attribute) is asset
size for bank v1 , and this money is going to be returned in l (“length” attribute) iterations, i. e.
“length” is the number of iterations before the link disappears. For bank v2, this interaction is
classiﬁed as a liability.
On each iteration, former interaction terms can expire, and edges and nodes can appear and
disappear. So, for each iteration t, we ﬁx the dynamic graph state Gt, which can be split for
layers such that L0 comprises all edges of Gt, and each edge of the other layers Li is in L0.
According to Central Bank of Russia requirements [2] (based on the Basel Accord [12]),
links are distinguished for three kinds of durability — instant, short-term and long-term — and
are claimed to be consistent inside each group. That is why we distinguish three sets of length
values: L1 = {1}, L2 = {2, . . . , 30}, L3 = {31, . . . , 500}. This means that we have 3 layers in
the multiplex network according to these sets, and the fourth one, L0, comprises the edges from
these three. This model representation can be generalized for any number of layers providing
more accurate analysis.
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Figure 2: Banking system model visualisation. Interactions between banks and customers are
represented by links, green balls embody banks, and blue ones embody customers
3.2 Banks
The model is based on that described in [6]. As we are interested in studying interbank market
stability for the case when the central bank does not save banks and the control function is
implemented by code, we do not distinguish the central bank as a single node. There are two
kinds of nodes: for banks and for customers, and links for interaction between them. Customers
do not interact with each other.
Banks can interact with each other and with customers. We introduce the following notation:
A — assets, L — liabilities, IA — interbank assets, EA — external assets, IL — interbank
liabilities, EL — external liabilities, NW — net worth, AF — available funds.
By deﬁnition: ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
A = IA+ EA,
L = IL+ EL,
NW = A− L.
(2)
As we noticed while analysing annual reports of Russian banks , balance sheet structures can
be performed as in formulae 3: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
EA = α1 ·A
L = α2 ·A
EL = α3 · L
NW = α4 ·A
OC = α5 ·NW,
(3)
where α1 = 0.8, α2 = 0.86, α3 = 0.59, α4 = 0.13, α5 = 2.08.
2
2 On the average from annual reports of banks [1].
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(a) Interaction before
bankrupt elimination (b) Relative investment sizes
(c) The corresponding interac-
tion after bankrupt eliminating
Figure 3: The bankrupt elimination scheme.
In the network representation of a banking system, we imply output links as assets, and
input links as liabilities, while external and interbank links correspond to bank-to-customer and
bank-to-bank interactions, respectively.
Banks try to avoid negativity of both available funds and net worth in their activity. This
is important because non-negative net worth guarantees the minimization of losses in the case
of bankruptcy, and available funds are necessary for deals. We assume that a bank is bankrupt
if it has negative net worth or available funds.
If a bank risks to become a bankrupt after satisfying a customer’s request, it attempts to
borrow funds from other agents of the interbank network. If other banks cannot support it,
the customer’s request is rejected. The bank also tries to borrow or to expose additional funds
if it already has negative net worth or available funds to improve its condition. The banks for
interaction are chosen with probability proportional to that bank’s size of assets.
If it has become impossible to improve a bankrupt bank’s condition with the help of other
banks, we eliminate it from the network. For elimination we use an algorithm minimizing losses
after bankruptcy (Fig. 3).
The losses can be estimated with the formulae below:
AggeregatedLosses =
∑
i
(
(Lbi −Abi) · χ1 + EAbi · χ2
)
where {bi} — set of bankrupts, and
χ1 =
{
1, if L > A.
0, otherwise.
(4)
χ2 =
{
0, if L > A.
1, otherwise.
(5)
Elimination can have two causes in the model, so assessment has two components. If the neg-
ative net worth was the reason for bankruptcy, then NW < 0 ⇒ A < L. So, after eliminating,
there will be the list of blank liabilities aﬀecting other agents and spreading contagion. There-
fore, losses are estimated as the diﬀerence between liabilities and assets in this case. The other
reason for bank elimination is negative available funds. In this case, the assets list is greater
than liabilities one, so we assume that interbank assets will be settled somewhere in the network
and we estimate losses as the value of external assets.
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3.3 Customers
Customers are organizations, credit unions, large companies, budget enterprises, etc. The av-
erage number of customers per bank is approximately 100, implying it to be proportional to
bank’s asset size after initialization. On each iteration, several customers ask the bank for a
loan or initiate a deposit, according to their needs. The probability of a loan can be described as
Pr(loan) =
α1
α1 + α2 · α3 (6)
which also follows the relations we have obtained after annual reports analysis [6].
A customer’s request requires a bank and a term for interaction to be speciﬁed. Bank
selection probability is proportional to the bank’s assets’ sizes. Terms are divided into three
groups: overnight (for 1 iteration), short-term (less than 30 iterations) and long-term (over 30
iterations). For choosing the customer’s request term, two random numbers are used. The ﬁrst
one is for choosing the kind of durability, and the second one is used to set the ﬁnal term. These
actions are to guarantee all kinds of links.
3.4 Cases
Customer poverty attack. With respect to the poverty of customers, we mean their buying
ability decreases, so that credits occur more often than deposits. When CustomersPoverty
attack is initiated, we set loan probability Pr(loan) = 0.95, so that 95% of all customers’
operations are loans for all further iterations.
Bank run attack. A bank run is a phenomenon that occurs when a majority of customers
withdraw their funds from accounts. To implement a similar scenario in our model, we choose in
the network several banks with maximal values for external liabilities. Then, we withdraw each
customer’s deposit in those banks’ external liability lists. In this way, we yield each attacked
bank having zero external liabilities.
4 Experimental results
In the current section, we consider the results for the next three scenarios. The ﬁrst one is a
plain scenario without any attack. The majority of bankruptcies are in the beginning before the
network stabilisation, and subsequently there is no further bankruptcies. The second and the
third scenarios have the same beginning, and then we provide an attack on the 60th iteration 3.
For the second scenario, the CustomersPoverty attack was implemented, and the BankRuns
attack was implemented for the third one. To trace the inﬂuence of these attacks, topological
and ﬁnancial network features were measured. Here, they are described at 0, 5, 57, 62, 100
iterations, i. e. when the network was just generated, after the ﬁrst bankruptcies, before attack
and after it. Formulae for the ﬁnancial features evaluating was taken from the standart [2].
Topological features was evaluated with NetworkX package.
4.1 Average path length
The current model was tuned to have an average path length of approximately 2 for its ﬁrst
iterations according to the data provided by [3, 14, 8]. As edges were equally generated for
3We have chosen the 60th iteration, because for initial conﬁguration parameters of our model stabilisation
had already been ﬁnished by that iteration
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(b) Scenario 2 with CustomersPoverty attack
Figure 4: Average path length dynamic. Here aggr−IB is aggregated interbank layer, shT−IB
— short-term interbank layer, lT − IB — long-term interbank layer, shT −BC — short-term
bank-with-customer layer
all layers the similar path length values were obtained for all of them. At the same time,
processes on the model increase average path length for the short-term layer upto 4. Note
that average path length for bank-with-customers short-term network was twice larger in the
beginning, and grew up with increasing of short-term interbank layer path length. Values for
long-term interbank layer and aggregated layer are rather similar during all modelling period,
that could be explained with number of edges, which is about 8000 for them both (while short-
term interbank layer contains about 700 edges). Changes initiated by CustomerPoverty attack
are not reﬂected by interbank aggregated and long-term features, while average path length for
short-term interbank layer has crucial increase.
In conclusion, changes in the network dynamics are not always reﬂected by values of topo-
logical features for aggregated interbank market, that is why using multiplex representation is
useful. On the other hand, some layers (e. g. long-term interbank layer from our model) can be
quiet similar with aggregated interbank network, so it should be taken into account in network
fragmentation into diﬀerent layers.
4.2 Average clustering coeﬃcient
Figure 5 shows average clustering coeﬃcient decreases in aggregated interbank layer for the
beginning of modelling and slower decreases for the further scenario evolution. Considering
ﬁrst iterations it corresponds to sharply fall in an instant layer, and, in opposite, uniformly fall
in long-term layer. So one can clearly see the changes in the instant layer has the most impact
on aggregated layer. On the other hand, variety of edges length comprised to long-term layer
is wide, that is why values for the long-term layer can also be messed as for aggregated layer.
So one can see average clustering coeﬃcient not always reﬂects chages in the network.
4.3 Comparison with ﬁnancial indicators values for ﬁxed node
Fix an arbitrary bank in the network and consider values of asset, capital, yield and liquidity
indicators evaluated in the beginning of modelling, and before and after attack. Remember,
values should be less than 2.3 according to standard [2].
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Figure 5: Average clustering coeﬃcient values for instant, short-term, long-term and aggregated
layers of interbank network and for short-term layer of bank-with-customers network. Modelling
scenario with bank-runs attack
Figure 6a shows values keep less than 2.3 and do not change sharply for the ﬁrst scenario
near the 60th iteration. On the contrary, changes in the beginning of modelling strongly impact
ﬁnancial indicators values. Corresponding topological values have the same behaviour for the
aggregated layer, but one can see jumps after 60th iteration for short-term layer. Thus, one can
conclude topological features not always reﬂects the network dynamics we are interested in.
5 Conclusion and discussion
Experiments show, one can not rely on features evaluated for aggregated interbank layer, as
they comprise combination of the same feature for other layers, and it is diﬃcult to interpret.
Sometimes features evaluated for separate layers correspond to network dynamics better. On
the other hand, single layer features can reﬂects network dynamics we are not interested in.
Experimental results showed the way for separate layers formation is signiﬁcant. We distin-
guished edges for layers accordingly to ﬁnancial standards, and got topological features values
in the long-term interbank layer was similar to those for the aggregated interbank layer.
Considered topological features evaluated over banks-with-customers network for each layer
did not reﬂect banking system dynamics. Possibly, topological features taking input and output
links or possible contagion paths into account would be more appropriate.
Considered experiments use scenarios initiated by external forces, so network topology
changes were initiated by attacks. Thus we can not conclude which values of features corre-
spond to stable or non-stable system’s state. Further research could include modelling scenario
when stable situation is replaced by crises one without external intervention, like our attacks.
This approach could use network feature vector to predict crises, taking as input a model con-
ﬁguration and agents’ policies. However, such modelling scenario requires additional knowledge
about banking systems behavioural patterns.
Using of multiplex networks for banking systems representation provides more complete
analysis. This way is more natural and explainable. The need of initial parameters inﬂuence
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(a) Scenario 1 without attacks.
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(b) Scenario 2 with CustomersPoverty attack.
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(c) Scenario 3 with BankRun attack.
Figure 6: Financial and topological features for ﬁxed node. Financial features on the left hand
side, and topologycal features on the right one. Here cAggr — clustering coeﬃcient for node
in the aggregated interbank layer, bAggr is corresponding betweenness centrality value, cShT
and bShT are clustering and betweenness values for the short-term interbank layer. Values for
node betweenness are displayed as 10 times greater.
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formalization lead us to necessity of layer performance, and so do need of ﬁnding topology
features the most related with stability. Current paper shows features evaluated for single
layers bring quiet another information than features, evaluated for all networks links. Taking
into account durability of links is more applicable for predictions, and help avoiding immediate
uncertainty. Using multiplex with more layers would provide more accurate analysis.
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